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Chile’s	2017	presidential	election:	evaluating	the
second	Bachelet	government
As	the	nation	heads	to	the	polls,	the	balance	sheet	of	Michelle	Bachelet’s	second
government	is	negative,	write	Roland	Benedikter	(EURAC	Research,	COHA,
University	of	Wroclaw)	and	Miguel	Zlosilo	(Artool,	Chile)	in	the	first	of	a	two-part
series	on	Chile’s	2017	presidential	election.
•	Read	part	two:	Who	will	win	and	why?
On	Sunday	19	November,	Chile	goes	back	to	the	ballot	box,	with	presidential	and	general	elections	likely	to
produce	another	change	of	course	in	the	nation’s	young	democracy.	But	after	nearly	four	years	of	the	second
mandate	of	the	centre-leftist	government	of	Michelle	Bachelet	(since	March	2014),	the	mood	of	Chilean	voters	is
negative,	and	recent	polls	reveal	a	majority	unsatisfied	with	the	development	of	the	nation.
Having	served	two	terms,	Michelle	Bachelet	bids	farewell	to	the	presidency	in	2017	(Alex
Proimos,	CC	BY	2.0)
Changing	perceptions	of	the	Bachelet	governments
Bachelet’s	first	term	(2006-10)	ended	in	March,	2010,	with	record	popular	support	of	84	percent,	according	to	the
Santiago-based	polling	firms	Adimark	GfK,	CEP	Chile,	and	CADEM.	At	the	start	of	her	second	term	in	March
2014,	Bachelet	had	an	approval	rating	of	65	percent,	but	this	decreased	to	24	percent	at	the	end	of	2015	and	had
sunk	to	21	percent	in	August	2017.	Disapproval	of	Bachelet	was	higher	than	for	any	other	president	since	2000
when	it	hit	56	percent	in	the	same	month.
Adimark	and	CEP	found	in	August	2017	that	69	percent	of	Chileans	considered	the	country	to	be	in	a	state	of
stagnation,	while	just	16	percent	believed	that	it	was	progressing	and	14	percent	saw	it	in	decline.	These	are	the
most	negative	figures	of	any	recent	president.
Moreover,	approval	of	Bachelet’s	government	decreased	to	19	percent	in	August	2016,	rising	slightly	during	her
final	year	in	tenure	to	reach	35	percent	in	August	2017.
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In	sum,	public	opinion	polls	shortly	before	the	elections	revealed	clear	discontent	with	Bachelet’s	politics,	as	well
as	with	most	parts	of	Chile’s	political	system.
Understanding	shifts	in	voter	perceptions
As	usual	in	post-dictatorship	Chile,	the	mood	curve	of	voters	mirrored	developments	in	the	governing	political
alliance.		Chile’s	leftist	and	rightist	party	alliances	often	start	out	with	great	pathos,	but	serious	divisions	between
their	constitutent	groups	soon	emerge.
Bachelet’s	mandate	was	a	constant	struggle	against	dissolution	of	her	alliance,	which	required	the	daily	forging	of
compromises	and	a	consistently	brave	face	on	difficult	circumstances.	This	led	to	a	succession	of	lukewarm
positions	which	could	satisfy	neither	the	political	nor	the	public	sphere,	since	they	were	in	stark	contrast	to	the
bold	moves	promised.
Without	doubt,	the	process	of	reform	promised	by	Bachelet	faced	many	headwinds.	The	fall	of	copper	prices,	the
temporary	stagnation	of	emerging	economies,	and	a	hesitant	recovery	of	major	trade	partners	certainly	did	not
help.
However,	the	failure	of	Bachelet’s	second	political	project	was	due	mainly	to	internal	problems	rather	than
external	influences.	There	was	a	constant	crisis	of	Bachelet’s	reform	project,	both	in	terms	of	popular	support	and
of	the	political	unity	of	her	alliance	at	the	institutional	level.		None	of	which	is	to	deny	that	her	efforts	did	generate
partial	success	and	a	symbolic	legacy	in	certain	domains,	not	least	gender	emancipation	and	the	environment.
The	overall	judgement	of	Chilean	academics,	commentators,	and	intellectuals	appears	to	be	that	Bachelet’s
second	government	failed	because	it	breached	her	five	fundamental	promises:
1.	 A	tax	reform	that	would	reduce	inequality	and	collect	3%	of	GDP	to	finance	free	education	for	all	without
putting	a	brake	on	economic	growth.
2.	 An	educational	reform	that	would	end	profit	in	education,	provide	universal	free	education,	and	improve	its
quality.
3.	 A	constitutional	reform	that	would	produce	a	new	constitution	with	the	meaningful	participation	of	Chilean
civil	society	and	in	full	respect	of	current	institutions.
4.	 A	labour	market	reform	that	would	end	the	growing	asymmetry	between	the	economic	power	of	employers
and	workers,	as	well	as	promoting	unionisation.
5.	 A	pension	reform	that	would	raise	pensions	via	a	better	structure	of	inter-generational	solidarity	and
bring	the	state	into	the	pension	market	to	increase	competition,	lower	costs,	and	boost	benefits	for
pensioners.
All	of	these	reform	goals	fell	short	of	the	expectations.
Bachelet’s	balance	sheet	on	five	fundamental	reforms
Bachelet’s	tax	reform	was	quickly	modified	and	became,	in	its	ultimately	half-hearted	incarnation,	a	perceived
cause	of	the	lax	growth	of	the	economy.	The	reform	was	widely	criticised	due	to	the	complexity	of	its	application,
particularly	by	SMEs.	Before	it	passed	congress,	it	saw	higher	approval	than	disapproval	rates.	But	once	the	law
was	passed,	the	trend	reversed	and	rejection	rose	to	twice	the	level	of	consent.
The	educational	reform	failed	to	offer	universal	free	education	for	all	students.	It	did	not	end	profit-making
in	higher	education,	and	it	introduced	few	concrete	measures	to	improve	the	quality	of	education.	It	was
opposed	by	the	Chilean	Council	of	Rectors	and	by	the	main	private	universities.	After	several	protests	marches	in
2015	public	disapproval	rate	of	this	reform	effort	reached	70%.		Disapproval	peaked	at	72%	shortly	after
Bachelet’s	Higher	Education	Reform	in	2016	and	declined	in	2017	to	52%.
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The	constitutional	reform	failed	to	generate	an	official	document	that	included	agreements	achieved	from	town-
council	meetings.	The	constituent	process	and	concrete	form	of	the	proposed	Magna	Carta	were	never	clarified.
The	reform	process	failed	to	define	a	strategy	to	generate	substantial	changes	in	the	constitution	and	was	not
able	to	specify	the	legal	form	of	carrying	them	out.
Bachelet’s	labour	reform	largely	displeased	the	unions,	which	represent	a	significant	portion	of	her	constituency
and	governing	majority.	Rather,	the	reform	provoked	deep	disputes	over	the	legitimacy	of	leadership.	It	criticised
the	business	community	and	SMEs:	the	first	because	of	its	profits	and	the	second	because	of	disparities	in	the
fiscal	treatment	of	large	firms,	SMEs,	and	workers.	Even	union	leaders	felt	the	reform	was	tailored	to	suit	the
needs	of	the	banks	rather	than	the	man	in	the	street.	Public	approval	of	the	labour	reform	declined	consistently
until	the	end	of	2016,	when	it	bounced	back	a	little.
Finally,	the	pension	reform	failed	to	become	a	bill,	despite	the	persistence	of	the	executive.	The	closest	it	came	to
realisation	was	the	so-called	Bravo	Commission,	which	failed	to	reach	a	consensus	between	those	in	favour
of	raising	the	retirement	age	and	those	favouring	a	so-called	solidarity	pillar,	including	private	pension	insurance.
This	reform	project	also	saw	higher	rates	of	public	disapproval	than	approval.
Overall,	Bachelet	has	proved	unable	to	capitalise	on	her	20%	percent	winning	margin	in	December	2013’s
second	round	and	move	forward	with	her	reform	project.	Despite	enjoying	an	unprecedented	majority	in	both
chambers,	she	did	not	properly	build	support	for	her	structural	reforms.	She	also	committed	serious	errors	in	the
selection	of	her	main	collaborators	at	the	level	of	ministers	and	advisers,	not	to	mention	the	involvement	of	her
son	Sebastián	Dávalos	in	a	real-estate	corruption	scandal	involving	parts	of	the	political	and	financial	elite.
Critics	were	able	to	play	up	failings	at	the	social	level,	but	also	at	the	macroeconomic	level.	During	Bachelet’s
second	mandate	neighbouring	Peru	outperformed	Chile	in	direct	foreign	investment,	threatening	Chile’s	dominant
position	in	the	copper	market	that	is	so	central	Chile’s	commercial	base.
Thus,	the	distance	between	concrete	results	and	the	ambitious	objectives	outlined	at	the	start	of	her	tenure
means	that	the	second	Bachelet	government	has	to	be	seen	as	a	failure.	Whatever	the	outcome	of	the	2017
presidential	election,	the	new	government	would	do	well	to	learn	from	Bachelet’s	missed	opportunities.	
Notes:
•	The	views	expressed	here	are	of	the	authors	and	do	not	reflect	the	position	of	the	Centre	or	of	the	LSE
•	Please	read	our	Comments	Policy	before	commenting
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